“Lingua” or “Linguaggio”?

“Lingua” or “Linguaggio”?

da | Apr 29, 2023 | Etologia

Italian language distinguishes between linguaggio and lingua. Those have a different meaning and are used in different contexts. In English, it does not exist such a distinction. English speakers would use “language”, indicating “Italian language” or “musical language” (they would also say “programming languages”).

Italian speakers would say lingua italiana and linguaggio musicale, or linguaggio delle api, meaning bee’s communication. The word linguaggio is mainly used to indicate a system of communication that includes sounds, voice modulation (paraverbal language), gestures and facial expressions (nonverbal language). Additionally, there exist additional languages used for specific purposes, viz. programming languages (Phyton, Java, C++, etc.).

This “Italian” distinction is not found in all natural languages. For instance, it is not found in Dutch, Ukrainian, Russian, Estonian or Arabic. Arguably, only romance languages have it.*

Not to mention that non-human animals (henceforth animals) have a language indeed. Precisely, a symbolic communication they use to convey messages (even deceitful ones) to their counterparts (and not only to them). Animal symbolic communication (see Pepperberg, 2021) is extraordinarily complex insofar, for humans is untranslatable (Andrews, 2020, pp. 120–121) if they do not have any knowledge of it. Animal communication may include sounds (alarm signals**), gestures, and dances (i.e., the waggle dance). Several examples show fascinating animal symbolism: Andrews (2020) mentioned an example of solidarity. It was observed that whales beach themselves after one does *** (p. 8).

Although animals are not linguistically competent as it happens, they still communicate with each other. That is a form of intelligence.

One of the goals of Post-humanism is indeed to overcome the traditional idea of human supremacy over animals by admitting animal intelligence and sentience for many years denied. Alas!

*Please, post a comment if you know any other language that has this distinction!

**Marchesini (2022) wrote that animal alarm signals are not necessarily expressed through sound. They are also expressed through pheromones or chemicals (p. 105).

***See Whitehead and Rendell (2014).

 

 

 

 

References

Andrews, K. (2020). The animal mind. An introduction to the Philosophy of animal cognition (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203712511

Marchesini, R. (2022). The creative animal. How every animal builds its own existence. London: Palgrave Macmillan Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07414-1

Pepperberg, I. (2021). Symbolic communication in the grey parrot. In A. Kaufman, J. Call & J. Kaufman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of animal cognition (pp. 56–73). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108564113.005

Whitehead, H., & Rendell, L.Rendell. The Cultural Lives of Whales and Dolphins. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2014.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Don’t underestimate octopuses!

Don’t underestimate octopuses!

da | Mar 31, 2023 | Etologia, Filosofia

Andrews (2020) defined non-human animals (henceforth, animals) as being minded. The professor claimed that it doesn’t exist a unique mind (p. 8), as changes occur (i.e., trauma injuries), some of which are inevitable (i.e., ageing) (ibid.). She maintained that animals, as well as humans, are minded indeed. It doesn’t exist a unique intelligence either (see Gardner (1983)’s theory of multiple intelligence). Depending on their needs, animals are good at different things and have different complex capacities (i.e., learning, problem-solving, planning, memory) (Godfrey-Smith, 2016, pp. 50—51).

So do octopuses! For instance, they are able to “see” colours through the reflection on their skin. Namely, they can distinguish colours through the brightness reflected on their skin (ibid., pp. 119—121). Octopuses have millions of neurons* in their tentacles “which can […] taste and touch and also control motions” (ibid., 2017, § 1).

Even though primates are more similar to humans, they are not the only ones. Between humans and dogs, there is a phylogenetic distance, yet they are socially similar. In contrast, reptiles and xenarthras are judged to be the least similar ones (Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal, 2022, p. 234**).

Although octopuses are not as similar to humans as other animal species, we still have a common (very distant) ancestor (Godfrey-Smith, 2017, § 4). Octopuses are “smart”—Godfrey-Smith (2016) is reluctant to use that term. To be more specific, they own complex cognitive processes (i.e., memory, recognition, exploration, discrimination, and learning) (ibid., 2017). Like other animal species, they are able to acquire information and use it under certain circumstances (Rossano and Kaufhold, 2021). They aree not “dumb” species whatsoever. Nevertheless, not everyone is convinced of the idea that animals are sentient beings that share similarities with humans; not in terms of linguistic competence, though. Animals are not linguistically competent as it happens, but still, they are intelligent.

Dupré (1996) said that intelligence doesn’t necessarily require language possession (p.331). Animals, through behavioural manifestations (i.e., the waggle dance performed by bees indicating the distance of the nectar source; see Wynne & Uoleil, 2013 for more details) or sounds (i.e., signals for warning; see Rossano and Kaufhold, 2021) communicate with their counterparts. That is still a medium to convey messages (Glock, 2000, p. 43). And octopuses know how to do that!

 

 

*close to dogs’ number (Godfrey-Smith, 2017, § 6).

**The similarity was rated by taking into account cultural origin [p. 230])

 

References

Andrews, K. (2020). The animal mind. An introduction to the Philosophy of animal cognition (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203712511

Dupré, J. (1996). The mental lives of nonhuman animals. In M. Bekoff & D. W. Jamieson (Eds.), Readings in animal cognition (pp. 323–336). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. NY: Basic Books

Glock, H.-J. (2000). Animals, thoughts and concepts. Synthese, 123(1), 35–64. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005295521736

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016). Other minds. The octopus and the evolution of intelligent life. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Godrey-Smith, P. (2017, January 1). The mind of an octopus. Scientific American. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-mind-of-an-octopus/ (Originally published in SA Mind, 28(1), 62—69, January 2017)

Lage, C. A., Wolmarans, D. W., & Mograbi, D. C. (2022). An evolutionary view of self-awareness. Behavioural Processes, 194(4), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2021.104543

Rossano, F., & Kaufhold, S. (2021). Animal communication overview. In A. Kaufman, J. Call & J. Kaufman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of animal cognition (pp. 5–35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108564113.003

Wynne, C. D. L., & Udell, M. A. R. (2013). Animal cognition. Evolution, behavior and cognition (2nd ed.). UK: Palgrave Macmillian.